Most power relationships between organizations and stakeholders are episodic circuits of power whereby resource dependence is exacerbated by prohibitive rules. Such relationships are usually constraining rather than empowering and generate resistance and reluctant compliance rather than co-operation and creativity. Clegg's (1989) concept of facilitative circuits of power, however, suggests that some power relationships, particular where high amounts of discretion are delegated, can result in innovation by stakeholders. Public sector agencies have multiple and diverse external stakeholder groups that they need to influence in order to implement their strategies. In this paper, we explore a facilitative circuit of power using a case study of a public sector research funding organization that employed strategic ambiguity to delegate considerable authority to stakeholders, stimulating a variety of creative responses during a period of major system restructuring. Risks associated with such a practice include the generation of active and passive resistance as well as a propensity for the system to revert to an episodic power circuit over time. Despite these risks, we propose that the deployment of strategic ambiguity is a previously unrecognized mode of high discretionary strategic agency in authority delegation that can generate creative responses on the part of stakeholders within a facilitative circuit of power.
The power of strategic discourse is a relatively new theme in the strategy literature (Barry and Elmes 1997; Hardy et al. 2000) . Writers have argued that organizations can achieve strategic change by engaging in discourse transformations that are intended to institutionalize meaning (Hardy et al. 1998: 66) in ways that support social or organizational goals during periods of change and which reconfigure power relations between organizations and those they seek to influence or control (Fairclough 1992) . We build on this literature by exploring how organizations might deploy a particular discourse practice in strategy, strategic ambiguity, to alter power relationships and catalyse stakeholders to engage with a strategic change process. In particular, we contend that strategic ambiguity can empower stakeholders by opening spaces for the co-creation of meaning within organizational discourse.
In this paper we explore the deployment of ambiguity as a strategy appropriate for public sector organizations seeking to effect a realignment of relationships with multiple stakeholder groups. In order to be effective, such a strategy must provide a means for central organizations to work through the tension between their desire to control stakeholders and their need for stakeholder collaboration and creative input (Reed 1985) . Stakeholder control may involve the direct use of organizational power to ensure co-operation with the change process. However, more subtle methods may be required if creative engagement rather than simple compliance is the goal. We propose that, in such cases, the dialectical process between the agency and stakeholders represents a 'circuit of power' (Clegg 1989) within which the agency delegates authority to stakeholders through its use of strategic ambiguity, thereby increasing its own power, but also empowering the stakeholders to respond.
The research reported in this paper draws on a case study of the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (the Foundation), a public sector research-funding body that attempted to transform the New Zealand science system. In order to achieve national goals -such as harnessing research and innovation for wealth creation -research-funding bodies must stimulate a wide range of innovative activity in their research provider and user stakeholder groups. This task is by no means straightforward. As public sector agencies, research-funding bodies have many more stakeholders to consider and manage than do most private sector organizations (Ring and Perry 1985) and with diversity comes difference. Public sector agencies also operate within a political environment which demands that they must be seen to give due consideration to the diverse aspirations of their stakeholders. We propose that the Foundation's strategic use of ambiguity in the resultant 'rules' for stakeholder relationships offers an example of a facilitative circuit of power (Clegg 1989) . By deploying 'strategic ambiguity' (Eisenberg 1984) , the Foundation delegated considerable authority to stakeholders and provided an enacted example of 'high discretionary strategic agency' (Clegg 1989: 199) that, in turn, stimulated creative engagement with stakeholders. We use the term 'strategic ambiguity' to mean the deliberate use of ambiguity in strategic communication in order to create a 'space' in which multiple interpretations by stakeholders are enabled and to which multiple stakeholder responses are possible. However, we further develop the concept of strategic ambiguity as a key element in a circuit of power in which the agency organization can potentially select discursive openness as an alternative to discursive closure, depending on whether they seek creative engagement with, or compliance from, their stakeholders (Reed 1985) .
In order to assess the potential of strategic ambiguity as a form of authority delegation for creative stakeholder engagement, we explore issues that fall at the intersection of several theoretical literatures. In the next section we review this literature. We then outline our research methods and present our case study of the Foundation. In the third section, we explain and discuss the Foundation's deployment of, and stakeholder responses to, strategic ambiguity as an illustration of delegation of authority in a circuit of power in practice. In the conclusion, we draw some implications for the management of strategic ambiguity.
Theoretical Review
In this section, we examine the literature on strategy in the public sector and particularly strategy related to stakeholders. We then discuss the concept of strategic ambiguity in more detail. Finally, we turn to the delegation of authority, and to Clegg's (1989) expansion of authority delegation as a component of circuits of power.
Strategic Management in the Public Sector
Strategic planning has become a firmly established component of public sector management. However, much of the literature on strategy in the public sector frames the topic in a very managerialist and prescriptive way, leaving little room for the vagaries that might enable public sector strategy to differ significantly from that employed in the private sector. There are, however, distinctive elements that delineate public sector management from 'generic' private sector management (Ring and Perry 1985) , which we summarize as: itinerant coalitions of convenience; timeliness-of-outcome pressures; numerous attentive stakeholder groups; open decision-making; and pervasive policy vagueness. These five distinctions overlap somewhat and result in two underlying themes that are important for considering elements of circuits of power: power interdependencies and strategic vagueness or ambiguity.
The first theme relates to the power interdependencies between stakeholders. Resources (including time) necessary for the implementation of strategies and the achievements of outcomes are often controlled by other organizations, necessitating a range of collaborative and/or control relationships with various stakeholders if goals are to be achieved. Skok (1989) indicates the dialectical nature of public sector strategy by suggesting that it should take account of agency power relationships within a network of functionally related organizations.
The second theme also results from the multi-stakeholder context of public sector strategy. Multiple stakeholders expose the decision-making process to widespread scrutiny, which in turn acts to constrain open discussion (Ring and Perry 1985) . Indeed, open discussion of goals or strategies may lead to the mobilization of dissent (Eisenberg 1984) and, ultimately, to the rejection of these goals and strategies by government. Similarly, the competition between public sector agencies for power and resources reduces the chances of co-operation and openness within the public sector itself. Thus, public sector agencies are confronted with the tension between the need to communicate multiple meanings with multiple stakeholders while at the same time maintaining the appearance of consistency in their enactment of policy (Leitch and Motion 1999) . One means of managing differing stakeholder demands is to maintain 'policy ambiguity'. Thus, the management of competing interests 'leads to negotiated compromises that are purposively vague' (Ring and Perry 1985: 278) . Indeed, Ring and Perry assert that 'ambiguity in strategy, characteristic of many public organizations, therefore, may be an asset' (1985: 278) as unambiguous articulation of strategy can produce counter-productive consequences. Thus, public sector strategies are often about conveying messages and initial bargaining positions to stakeholders (Miller 1989 ) rather than specific plans for future action.
Strategic Ambiguity
It would appear from our review above that ambiguity in policy statements assists in the management of stakeholders so that 'everyone can claim victory' (Miller 1989: 137) . Moreover, the choice of strategic goals and the language used to describe them is often made according to how the policy will look as much as for what it is trying to achieve (Miller 1989; Ring and Perry 1985) . Variously described over time as bureaucratic 'muddling through' (Lindblom 1959) and 'fuzziness' (Lerner and Wanat 1983 ), ambiguity appears to be tolerated in strategy within the public sector.
Certainly, Eisenberg asserted that clarity is only a measure of communicative competence when the communication 'goal is to be clear ' (1984: 230) . Given that not all communication is strategic, he defined strategic ambiguity as being those instances in which ambiguity is used purposefully to accomplish goals. Eisenberg and Goodall (1997) outlined four attributes of strategic ambiguity that are relevant for organizations. First, strategic ambiguity can promote 'unified diversity' in that it supports multiple viewpoints and fosters agreement on abstractions without limiting specific interpretations. Strategic ambiguity is found in organizational missions, goals and plans, allowing divergent interpretations to coexist and enabling diverse groups to work together (Eisenberg and Witten 1987) . Second, strategic ambiguity 'preserves privileged positions' by shielding the powerful from close scrutiny (Eisenberg and Goodall 1997: 24) . Third, strategic ambiguity is deniable so that words that seem to mean one thing can, under pressure, 'seem to mean something else' (Eisenberg and Goodall 1997) . Finally, strategic ambiguity facilitates organizational change by enabling shifting interpretations of organizational goals.
Eisenberg's discussion of strategic ambiguity (1984) was focused on uses internal to the organization whereas our focus is on its use with external stakeholders. External uses of strategic ambiguity are most often discovered in the discussions of organizational communication during crises (Allen and Caillouet 1994; Paul and Strbiak 1997; Sellnow and Ulmer 1995; Weick 1988) . In crisis management, externally directed communication is viewed as being central to impression management to shape stakeholder attitudes (Allen and Caillouet 1994) . Corporate actors embed self-presentation strategies in their external communication in an attempt to control perceptions within their organizational field. Deniability is viewed as an important property of strategic ambiguity in these times (Paul and Strbiak 1997) as equivocality preserves future options, as well as allowing organizations to communicate different, sometimes contradictory, messages to distinct stakeholders (Sellnow and Ulmer 1995) . Thus, in its usage to date, strategic ambiguity has a particularly instrumental, and possibly unethical (Paul and Strbiak 1997) , flavour.
In contrast, we wish to reframe strategic ambiguity as having potentially creative implications for strategy and subsequent action. The usefulness of strategic ambiguity stems, we would argue, from the tension faced by organizations between their desire to control stakeholders and their need for positive collaboration with these same stakeholders in order to achieve their goals (Reed 1985) . Such multi-organizational collaborations around the achievement of goals are, however, highly problematic. As Clegg et al. (2002) argue, in the face of such complexity, organizations have a tendency to adopt a control mentality, which may be appropriate -from an organizational perspectivewhen the organizational goal is well defined and when stakeholders are supportive or at least compliant. In such cases a clarity-based strategy involving clearly stated directives to stakeholders from whom action is required may be successful. However, when the goal is less clear, when stakeholders are not compliant and, perhaps, have power bases from which to resist the goal, or when achievement of the goal requires a creative engagement between the organization and its stakeholders, strategic ambiguity may be more appropriate.
Delegation of Authority in Circuits of Power
The question remains, however, regarding why strategic ambiguity should stimulate such creative engagement with external stakeholders. The potential of strategic ambiguity, we argue, stems from the fact that it is a form of delegation of authority that is highly enabling rather than controlling in nature. As alluded to earlier, delegation of authority is a function of the power relationships that exist within and, as has been the subject of more recent research (Clegg et al. 2002) , between organizations. 'Power has typically been seen as the ability to get others to do what you want them to, if necessary against their will, or to get them to do something they otherwise would not' (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 623) . In order to achieve such strategic agency, the discretion of the other actors must be disciplined in some way so that 'from the strategist's points of view, such other agencies will become merely authoritative relays, extensions of strategic agency' (Clegg 1989: 199) . Clegg (1989) offers a framework made up of two 'circuits of power' that represent power relationships between an organization and its stakeholders (Figure 1 ). The framework was designed to underpin discussions of intraorganizational power relationships but we propose that it is also applicable to inter-organizational interactions for which a dialectical power relationship exists, and will now describe it from an inter-organizational perspective. In Clegg's framework, the social relations between an organization (agency) and its stakeholders constitute the perception of that central organization's 'agency' and are the result of the organization's previous power relationships. An organization's power is realized through the management of 'standing conditions' by which the resources needed by other organizations are controlled. This circuit of episodic power constitutes the organization's 'power over' its stakeholders and 'will invariably be accompanied by resistance', as indicated by the pairs of arrows between boxes. It is the 'most apparent, evident and economical circuit of power' (Clegg 1989: 215 ).
Clegg's second circuit, however, represents power as a potentially productive activity. This circuit comes into play when the rules of practice are changed or destabilized in some way, whether influenced by the central organization or by 'exogenous external contingencies'. Altered 'rules fixing relations of meaning and membership' refix the way in which social relations occur. They can also facilitate or restrict the way in which productive activity takes place, thus empowering or disempowering stakeholders that the central organization wishes to influence. It is in this circuit that the mode of authority delegation becomes increasingly important to the resulting social relations and outcomes. Strategic agency entails delegation of authority and, in turn, 'delegation implies that discretion attaches to delegates' (Clegg 1989: 200) . Delegated others cannot, therefore, be guaranteed to act in predictable or certain ways. Clegg refers to this outcome as 'the central paradox of power': 'the power of an agency is increased in principle by that agency delegating authority; the delegation of authority can only proceed by rules; rules necessarily entail discretion and discretion potentially empowers delegates' (Clegg 1989: 201) .
What, then, is the relationship between strategic ambiguity and the delegation of authority in Clegg's second circuit of power? We propose that strategic ambiguity is one way of achieving what Clegg (1989) terms 'high discretionary strategic agency', a situation in which 'power will be less prohibitive and more productive, more facilitative of desired outcomes through the disciplined discretion of the agency of empowered authorities'. In comparison with the episodic power represented in Clegg's first circuit, the effect is 'not so much to forbid or restrict or prohibit but to enable creativity' (Clegg 1989: 199) . Given that 'rules are not absolute but are open to diverse interpretation' with not all interpretations being equal (Clegg 1989: 209) , 'ruling' in this circuit becomes a 'sense-making process whereby meaning' is the result of contested interpretations (Clegg 1989: 200) .
Adding strategic ambiguity into this circuit of power suggests that purposively being unclear in the articulation of the agency's strategies and the rules surrounding delegation of authority enables this sensemaking to happen with maximum discretion in the space between the organization and delegates. Without fixed and clear 'rules of the game', the contested interpretation and sensemaking becomes a dialectical or iterative process as the boundaries of discretion in the delegation of authority are tested and negotiated, innovation in techniques of discipline and production possibly occur, social relations change, new outcomes result and the circuit begins over again as rules are altered in response. In order to illustrate the role of strategic ambiguity as high discretionary strategic agency in such a circuit of power and the accompanying sensemaking process, we will draw on this interpretation of Clegg's (1989) circuit of power framework to provide an analytical basis for the analysis of our research results.
Research Approach and Case Study
The research described in this paper was part of a larger research project, which examined a change management process undertaken by the Foundation, both internally and from the perspective of the organization's major stakeholders, including nine Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) and eight universities. A case study approach was taken (Eisenhardt 1989) in order to develop an in-depth understanding of the change processes and the policy, stakeholder and organizational environment that existed prior to, during and immediately after the period of change (Pettigrew 1990 ). This approach was chosen as the most appropriate method to illuminate an organizational change process in action, and appears to be the method most often employed in 'attempts to provide process models of organizations' (Bryman 1989: 172) .
In order to build the case study, interviews were carried out with sixteen current foundation staff including the chair of the board, the chief executive, the senior management team and all but one of their direct reports, as well as a sample of other employees (designated as 'FR' after quotations). Four managers who had previously worked for the Foundation just prior to or during the change process were also interviewed (designated as 'exFR' after quotations). Seventeen representatives of twelve stakeholder organizations were interviewed with fifteen of these interviewees having a direct communication responsibility on behalf of their organization with the Foundation (designated as 'SH1' to 'SH12' after quotations). The interviews were semistructured and were of one to three hours in duration.
In addition, several hundred texts of varying sizes originating from before, during and after the dates at which key strategic change decisions were made were studied. These texts included: official Foundation publications such as annual reports and statements of strategic intent; discussion documents released to the public during the transition; presentation material from Foundation presentations to stakeholders; internal management documents; transcripts of an internal e-mail change discussion forum; and all internal communication and media materials. These data, combined with the case study material, were then used to build the description of the change process presented in the next sections. Using illustrative quotations from the interviews and extracts from relevant texts, we first describe the environment in which the Foundation operated in order to provide the context in which the social relations took place; second, we briefly describe the way in which the Foundation communicated and worked with stakeholders prior to the change process as an illustration of episodic agency power relations; third, we outline the new stakeholder interaction process, which we propose as an example of facilitative power relations.
The Case Study
During the 1980s and 1990s, New Zealand progressed through a period of macro-economic stabilization and structural reform, particularly in the public sector, that has been called one of the 'most notable episodes of liberalization that history has to offer' (Evans et al. 1996 (Evans et al. : 1856 . Commencing in 1984, the majority of the reforms took place over a ten-year period and implementation in the science system has been viewed as one of the clearest examples of the reform principles. The reforms included the implementation of private sector management principles into the public sector. Also central to the reforms was the separation of policy from operational functions, a move from the funding of inputs to the specification of outputs to be purchased, and the notion that the government was interested in public agencies both as a purchaser of their goods and services and as their owner (Walker 1996) . Impetus for the creation of the Foundation in 1989 arose from the government's decision to separate the purchasing (or funding) of science outputs from both policy creation in relation to R&D and from the provision of research.
In 1992, the government transferred the research carried out by primarily discipline-based government departments to ten CRIs oriented towards economic, environmental or social sectors. CRIs are governed by boards of directors and have to be financially viable, but are owned by the government and must engage in activity for the 'benefit of New Zealand'. In conjunction with the organizational restructuring, a contestable funding system was created by the Foundation for the purchase of research outputs. In line with the prevailing neo-liberal economic ideology, this system was perceived as effectively creating a 'market' for government-funded science. Government, using expert panels, set strategic priorities for the funds. Research providers submitted bids to the Foundation, which were peer-reviewed, and then advisory committees made allocation decisions.
Since its creation, a number of significant shifts have been discernible within the strategy of the Foundation (Table 1) . Initially, Foundation managers saw their task as enhancing the quality or 'excellence' of New Zealand research. Later, the criteria for funding coupled excellence with 'relevance' for research 'users'. The internal operations and external relationships of the Foundation focused on achieving efficiency and effectiveness (in terms of delivery of benefits to 'users') in the process of fund management. In 1999, the next shift in the system led to an increased emphasis on desired research 'outcomes', a much stronger 'future focus', and the re-categorization of research into strategic portfolios. Central to this transformation was the reframing of the Foundation's primary purpose as managing 'investments' on behalf of the government. Simultaneously, the Foundation initiated a radical internal change process aimed at reflecting the investment strategy within its own organizational structure. The Foundation, therefore, has undergone several significant periods of change in strategy, moving from prudent fund management to investing in wealth creation for New Zealand.
The Circuits of Power
In this section, we explore the strategic changes enacted by the Foundation with reference to Clegg's (1989) The 'old' pre-1999 funding system involved a well-specified process by which funding priorities were stated, available funding was set, and details of application methods and decision-making processes were well known within the research provider community. The Foundation sought to manage the application and decision-making process with optimum accountability and had provided more and more information about the 'perfect process' to stakeholders. Although applicants viewed the process as rather onerous, most were comfortable in the knowledge that it was transparent and appeared to be equitably applied:
'The processes were robust, were fair, were transparent ... it was an unemotional process system.' (SH7)
Three related themes emerged in the interviews from discussions of the 'old system', which reflect in Clegg's (1989) terms the inherently episodic agency nature of this 'process perfection' phase. First, the system was perceived to have become overly rules-based, such that the Foundation and its delegated committees had very tight control of the standing conditions surrounding the funding system: 'From a [research provider] perspective, there was just a series of hoops that you know you have to go through, there was a number of forms you have to fill out and a process you need to go through. ' (exFR) Second, the system was perceived to have degenerated into a game. Once stakeholders understood the fine detail of the standing conditions, their resistance to the episodic agency primarily took the form of manipulative game playing within the Foundation's processes. This manipulation, in turn, motivated the Foundation to alter the detail of the process for each funding round in order to control the level of manipulation, and lessen stakeholder resistance. However, the outcome of this episodic agency, whereby the standing conditions became increasingly specified and controlled with each cycle, was the building in of an inherent conservatism into the research funded and undertaken: 'All we did was do the same work by changing the emphasis in terms of the applications ... effectively it was a process of playing the game with this year's rules. ' (SH2) 'In an application-based system, providers tended to give what they thought we would fund, not what was best for the country. We say we want what's best for the country, we got simply what they thought we would fund and typically that was less risky. They built a conservatism into the process. ' (FR) Third, there was a sense that these tightly controlled conditions were resulting in undesirable social relations within the research provider community, finding expression in a lack of collaboration. In addition, the funding by the Foundation of a scientific team undermined the relationship between the Foundation and the research provider: 'You sweated blood over the applications and by god it was your money if you got it ...[The Foundation was] regarded very much by the science community as their employer rather than [the research provider]'. (SH2) 'The process was very competitive and it had certainly had negative consequences in terms of a lack of real collaboration, real co-operation and real sharing across institutions who felt for various reasons they were or were not getting their share of the pie. Even if they didn't have any rights in the pie, that's how people felt. ' (SH7) This 'process perfection' system was eventually rejected by the Foundation because the system did not appear to be delivering the desired outcomes despite the detailed controls imposed on the processes. The Foundation's exasperation with their 'powerlessness' to control the responses of the stakeholders with this conventional rule-based funding system was clear: ' The negative aspects of those [research provider] behaviours are partly related to our inability to communicate our intent properly. [Research providers] misinterpret what we're trying to say and create a set of behaviours which they think will get them money but aren't actually what we wanted them to do.' (FR) In summary, the old 'process perfection' funding system was the epitome of the episodic agency circuit of power (Figure 1 ) through which the central agency, the Foundation, exerted authority over the events of interest, in this case, the distribution of funding for research. However, the Foundation's, and some of its stakeholders', increasing frustration with this one modality of rule, such that no nuance of alteration in the standing conditions seemed to enable the Foundation to achieve the desired outcomes, provided an important impetus for change. This impetus found support from the broader sociopolitical context of a government-driven national strategy oriented towards transforming New Zealand into a 'knowledge economy'. The view of government and of decision-makers within the Foundation was that neither the Foundation nor the New Zealand science and innovation system generally were prepared for their new roles within such an economy. The drive to create a 'knowledge economy' was a major contextual factor behind the Foundation's change process and, together with the dissatisfaction with the old conventional system, provided enough will to break this apparently 'vicious' episodic agency cycle.
'And in With the New' Facilitative Power Circuit: Investing in Wealth Creation
A series of major documents issued by the government were the main conduits through which the Foundation's stakeholders learned of the strategic change that reframed the Foundation's role as an investor and its move to implement an apparently facilitative power relationship with the research sector (Figure 2) . The first task was to communicate the transformed 'rules of engagement' between the Foundation and research providers. The Foundation's Statement of Intent (SOI), released in July 1999, was perhaps the most obvious indicator to stakeholders that the old episodic power relationship was being superseded. Although ' investment' had been a part of previous mission statement, this SOI elevated the profile of 'investment' and broadened its application to the innovation system as a whole. Internal restructuring at the Foundation also reflected the new strategy. Fund management, which had previously been in scheme-related silos, was merged into one group under the title 'investment operations'. A separate 'portfolio management' group -charged with developing an investment framework for the research portfolios -was also established. The Foundation advertised for a new 'group manager, portfolio management', with the skills required including the understanding of 'investment principles'. This advertisement, which appeared in all of the national newspapers, publicly signalled the Foundation's intention to emphasize investment in its internal operations.
In August 1999, the Foundation staged a travelling 'roadshow' to launch its new SOI to stakeholders. The Foundation told stakeholders that the new system would: '... use words such as investor, risk profiles, leverage, negotiated portfolios, auditing process, partnerships, collaboration, networks, governance, stewardship, incentives, empowerment etc. ' (FR) In marked contrast to the Foundation's previous process-oriented communication, these words were employed to illustrate the strategic shift rather than to provide specific guidelines for research providers. In September 1999, the Foundation announced that it would not call for competitive proposals from providers for the year 2000/01. This major change in procedure was communicated in an invitation to providers to review and substantially renegotiate their research portfolios under the scenario of relatively secure funding levels. The stated intention was to engage research providers and the end users of research in a productive dialogue that would form the basis for future funding decisions. This dialogue was not, however, necessarily wholly positive for stakeholders. In a media statement accompanying the release of the 2000 SOI, the CEO stated: ' We are developing an innovation strategy which enables our investment to move to higher value areas, in particular emerging future sectors ... We will also work with stakeholders to develop and implement a disinvestment strategy.'
This public statement of an antonym for 'investment' immediately captured the attention of stakeholders wary of funding being withdrawn. It was followed in November 2000 by a document that framed 'disinvestment' as part of a review intended to identify areas in which the Foundation should not remain the 'lead investor'. Areas to be targeted for disinvestment were those that appeared to show the least promise for future 'wealth creation'. The Foundation proposed to 'work with stakeholders to wind down its investment in these areas through a structured disinvestment process that manages the risk of capability loss'.
Throughout these efforts to communicate, and to establish a mutual understanding of, the new system, the stakeholders were extremely wary of the lack of rule specification: ' In practical terms what is going to happen? We don't understand where the Foundation is going. At the moment it seems to me that they are going round and round in circles. ' (SH8) Stakeholders responded to the lack of detail in a number of ways. The strongest reactions were towards the ambiguities inherent in the 'investor' metaphor. Despite the fact that this was only one of four new roles, 'investor' quickly emerged as the keyword (Williams 1983) within the new strategy. Some stakeholders tried to resist the new system by expressing the view that 'investment', no matter how it was defined, was inappropriate for the science system: 'It isn't a biscuit factory. It may be trite to say science is different, but there are some creative elements to the whole affair that mean it's not like money in plus wise investment equals money out. ' (SH6) 'An investment strategy for science is a vastly complex, multi-disciplinary field. And to try to shoe-horn it into an investment strategy model drawn from the private sector tangible asset management is farcical ... I think you have to interpret some of the [material] coming out of [the Foundation] as being simply a cultural mindset change. ' (exFR) The transformation did indeed reflect a 'cultural mindset change' in which the explicitly stated purpose was to harness science more directly to economic goals and to serve the needs of 'users', primarily related industries. Some stakeholders supported this change, indicating their desire for a more 'businesslike' approach to science funding: 'I'm quite positive about the concept of understanding the investment and where the outputs and outcomes of government in terms of the future and having a much more structured and negotiated process to actually get some clarity around what is a reasonable amount of government investment in research. ' (SH2) '[The CRIs] are actually much more comfortable about outcomes because in the end they are run by business people and business people are outcome oriented. ' (SH11) Support from the profit-oriented CRIs for the changes was understandable and in some ways they saw the Foundation as simply 'catching up' with them. However, the universities with their pre-capitalist philosophical traditions were less enthusiastic about the changes. This split was noted by one Foundation staff member:
'You have a bunch of CRIs typically who are more commercially savvy. They've had to deal more with industry to greater or lesser extents over the last ten years. The universities will be interesting by their nature of just being militant. And of course we don't have such a great pull on them in terms of funding because their funding comes in from other areas. So in terms of cultural change, I can imagine there's going to be great debate about the cheapening of science and intellectual freedom. ' (FR) Through the process of establishing the 'rules fixing relations of meaning and membership', the Foundation's communication efforts resulted in two different response modes; one from the profit-oriented CRIs, which mostly embraced the new strategy and opted to co-operate with the Foundation, the other from the knowledge-oriented universities, which mostly saw the new strategy as either threatening or irrelevant and resisted or remained passive in the face of the change messages. Some providers -particularly many of the universities -simply waited for clear instructions and only acted when required to do so by the Foundation.
In contrast, the CRIs saw the changes towards, and lack of clarity around, investment activity as a rallying call to action. CRIs sought to offset the potential impact of disinvestment by reducing their reliance on Foundation funding. Searching for alternative customers and international funding sources became a high priority. Some providers were, however, constrained in their choices for alternative funding sources by the type of research they performed or sectors they served. The reduced-dependence strategy was intended to be a vehicle for stakeholder resistance aimed at the 'disinvestment' aspect of the new system. However, Foundation managers saw the possibility that research providers might become more independent as a positive outcome of the change process.
No matter what the response, however, all groups had to participate in the new 'obligatory passage points', that is, the negotiated settlements for funding, if they wished to be the recipients of 'investments' from the Foundation.
There were also indicators that the circuit of power was complete (Figure 2 ) with changes in the social relations between the Foundation and research providers, and within the provider community, already occurring:
'One of the interesting things that's happened through the negotiation process is there's been significant voluntary shifts of money between providers ...There's been less of a view [from research providers] that we must collect as much money as we can then sub-contract it.' (FR) ' We had written up a portfolio and I thought it was the best time that we had had in discussing funding with [the Foundation] because it had been done on the basis of our business as it was as a whole and saying this was the range of things that we were proposing that they fund across the board and why.' (SH1).
Significant shifts in research programmes occurred during the transition year negotiation rounds but the Foundation viewed these shifts as simply the first step. In future rounds the Foundation wished to be able to hold multi-provider negotiations for various research portfolios, which once again would alter the rules of the system and potentially initiate another cycle of power in which new understandings of rules of the relationship would need to be established.
Discussion: Strategic Ambiguity and Delegation of Authority
This case study shows how the Foundation deployed strategic ambiguity in ways that opened up the possibility that new meanings might be co-created with stakeholders. As described in the theoretical review, we propose that the use of ambiguity in communication strategies is a mode of authority delegation which can stimulate a facilitative circuit of power. In addition, we believe that this case study illustrates that strategic ambiguity is a form of 'high discretionary strategic agency' for which 'power will be less prohibitive and more productive, more facilitative of desired outcomes through the disciplined discretion of the agency of empowered authorities' (Clegg 1989: 199) .
In reflecting on the change process, the Foundation saw its efforts in moving to an investment paradigm as stimulating rather than attempting to force stakeholder change, which implies that they sensed the much more empowering nature of high discretionary strategic agency in comparison with the tightly controlled, restrictive authority delegation of the previous episodic power agency. Senior Foundation staff -at least in retrospect -appeared to understand that the organization was able to capitalize on the partly deliberate and partly emergent use of ambiguity in its strategy, to delegate considerable discretion to research providers that enabled them to change their behaviours. The Foundation found that, by employing ambiguity in its strategic communication, it had provided a 'state and space' within which stakeholders could respond creatively to the change messages. A Foundation manager described the underlying use of ambiguity in, and the empowering nature of, their new process: ' The philosophy was very much one of setting the overall directions and working with people to set these overall directions and then allowing the users and providers to work out the detailed science and detailed strategy that's sitting below that, that would deliver on those overall directions ... A key thing for me has always been trying to create an enabling research environment. If we get the culture right then we won't actually have to do anything. We ultimately as an organization will do ourselves out of a job. ' (FR) Having recognized the manipulative resistance to the old system, the Foundation regarded mutual trust as a key element of the process of stimulating desired stakeholder behaviours and reducing new forms of resistance. The Foundation had to trust that the stakeholders would take the opportunity to, and had the capacity to, respond appropriately in creating innovative pathways towards the desired outcomes. In turn, the provider stakeholders had to trust the Foundation to be able to develop flexible processes to support these paths and to invest wisely to manage the coherence of the new system, in place of the old and well understood system: 'Part of the exercise is this very subtle thing about moving people, stretching them but not throwing them overboard ... What we have to do is help [stakeholders] build capability in the same way as [the Foundation] is ... and they're working to do that.' (FR) This is not to say that the old episodic circuit of power was removed entirely. In the old system, the episodic instances of agency power were the sole mode with which the Foundation exercised its control over the resources and determined the actions of its providers. With the stimulation of the new investment system, the facilitative power circuit existed alongside a muchreduced episodic power circuit which came into force once the funding decisions had been made in order to control the details of the resultant funding contracts.
The CRIs constituted the stakeholder group most dependent on the Foundation for funding and most actively engaged in co-operating with aspects of the change process they supported and resisting those that they did not. In what can be viewed as an iterative effort to develop a shared understanding among research providers of the new ambiguous system, CRI strategy managers met to 'share notes' on a regular basis during this time, particularly when the Foundation released another document or introduced new terminology, such as 'disinvestment'. The Foundation was well aware of the scrutiny to which its communications were put:
'I talked to [a CRI manager] once and said are [the documents] useful and do you read them? And [he] said we read them, we read them backwards and then we soak them in lemon juice for the hidden messages!' (FR) One outcome of these regular meetings was the formulation of strategies for co-operation and resistance. Eisenberg (1984) argued that one advantage of strategic ambiguity is that it is always possible to deny that certain interpretations were ever intended. Ambiguous communication, however, also provided stakeholders with the resistance strategy of offering interpretations of messages that needed to be denied. For example, some research providers denounced the investment metaphor by arguing that it implied that the Foundation would act like a merchant bank. Despite efforts by the Foundation to deny that this meaning was intended, the merchant bank theme quickly took root in the stakeholder system. Delegation of authority empowers the agent controlling the resources and delegation with 'high discretionary strategic agency' can reinforce that power base. For example, the new system was perceived by stakeholders to have shifted the priority setting for research funding from the hands of external expert panels to the Foundation itself. To quote a Foundation manager, 'we were now masters of our own destiny', in that the Foundation not only invested in the system, it also acquired more power to decide on the priorities for investment. Higher-level directions were contained in many public documents but the absence of 'old system' rule clarity about how funding decisions would be made exacerbated the perception that the Foundation had greatly increased its power base. Rule ambiguity also increased the Foundation's perceived power within the negotiations phase because providers no longer knew whether their proposals matched the Foundation's intentions until they entered the negotiations.
The shift to a facilitative power relationship also initiated a shift of the power structure within research provider organizations. In the previous episodic power system, the locus of power within these organization was with the funded scientists who believed that they had a 'right' to the funding and 'owned' the grant. Within the new facilitative power relationship, the locus of power shifted to the research provider managers who participated in the 'obligatory' negotiations with the Foundation to determine funding levels for their organizations:
'Negotiated solutions rather than bids, well it depends where you want to put the power. If scientists bid the power lies to a certain extent with the scientists. Negotiations, well you've got the corporatist model where if you don't get on with you manager, hard luck, because management holds the power.' (SH11)
Conclusions
We agree with other writers that ambiguity can be an asset (Eisenberg 1984; Ring and Perry 1985) but perhaps in more complex ways than described previously, in that it also provides a mode of exerting influence over stakeholders to stimulate desired behaviours necessary for the implementation of strategy. In the public sector, where diversity exists on many dimensions, we postulate that the strategic use of ambiguity can be employed to manage the competing demands of stakeholders, particularly in times of change, and also to stimulate a diversity of stakeholder actions not possible within rule-bound, episodic power relationships. Strategic ambiguity can be deployed to 'widen the space of organizational possibility' by stimulating a facilitative power relationship between the central agency and its stakeholders. The constitutive dimension of discourse is well established within the organizational discourse literature (see for example the 2004 special issue, Organization Studies 25/1). As Hardy (2004: 416) notes, discourse scholars try to 'understand the processes whereby reality comes into being, rather than simply examine how actors make sense of an existing reality'. This study contributes to that literature by providing a detailed case of the purposive use of strategic ambiguity to facilitate a productive engagement between various discourse actors, in this case the Foundation and its research provider stakeholders.
It is, however, also obvious from this study that the instrumental use of the strategic ambiguity as a means of authority delegation carries some risks, in particular regarding the mobilization of resistance (Eisenberg 1984; Hardy 2004) . The high discretionary element that accompanies authority delegation using strategic ambiguity encourages a diversity of interpretations that is not under the control of the central agency. The strategic use of ambiguity is based upon the assumption that stakeholders will respond creatively. However, creativity can involve dissent through both active and passive resistance. Active resistance, such as the construction of the 'unconstructive' interpretations by CRI stakeholders, was the most blatant form of dissent faced by the Foundation, but the passive resistance of universities was also problematic. The lack of response from the universities to the authority delegated to them inhibited the Foundation's ability to harness this important component of New Zealand's science system to fulfil the government's vision of creating a knowledge economy. Such resistance to strategic ambiguity can be viewed as a means of reducing the perceived power of the agency creating the ambiguity. If trust between stakeholders and the agency is key to the implementation of strategy using ambiguity, then a paradox may emerge, in that the inherent lack of clarity may reduce that necessary level of mutual trust, particularly where stakeholders 'trusted' a previously existing tightly controlled episodic power relationship. Thus, contrary to the potentially empowering nature of facilitative relationships described by Clegg (1989) , stakeholders may perceive the opposite, that is, that the use of strategic ambiguity is another means of constraining or controlling stakeholders, particularly when this continues to be exacerbated by resource dependence.
Despite the potential negative impacts, however, we found that strategic ambiguity is a mode of high discretionary strategic agency that could be used to generate strategic 'spaces' in a facilitative power circuit in which stakeholders could take up the slack and respond in creative ways. In this case, we agree with Miller (1989) that public sector strategies are often more about conveying symbolic visions and outlining initial bargaining positions to stakeholders as a platform for more specific implementation strategies to emerge incrementally through negotiation. In particular, we found that coupling the strategic use of ambiguity with new 'obligatory passage points', in this case negotiated funding settlements, provided a measured means of shifting the system gradually to allow stakeholders to 'stretch' and change without excessive levels of discomfort as new modes of stakeholder interaction were established.
At the end of the study, the Foundation appeared to have stimulated an appropriate balance of stakeholder co-operation and creativity to enable the system to begin to move towards its vision. As the new facilitative investment mode becomes more defined operationally, the next struggle for the Foundation's leadership may centre on trying to ensure that the new system does not become as rigid and conservative as the 'old' one, that is, revert to a rule-bound, process-oriented system. This risk highlights another, namely reversion tendencies that reduce ambiguity and thereby drive the system towards an episodic power circuit. Inevitably, increased levels of detail, and rules generated through practice and precedent, will reduce the 'creative spaces' for the Foundation and its stakeholders. Thus, maintaining the ability of the New Zealand research system to shift in response to changing government policies and priorities could hinge on finding other strategic modes through which to initiate iterative facilitative power relationships, and thereby stimulate continual diversity and creativity of stakeholder responses.
What then, are the implications of this study of strategic ambiguity for organizations? Given the risks identified of employing strategic ambiguity, it is not a strategy to be implemented lightly. However, in situations where an organization is very dependent on altering stakeholder behaviour to achieve results, especially in times of great change, the high discretion associated with the practice is more likely to stimulate creativity in delegates than restrictive, rule-bound discretion. We identified creative compliance and active and passive resistance as typical responses to the delegated discretion, but there may also be other potential reactions to strategic ambiguity. Thus, we see great potential for further research into the employment of strategic ambiguity in a range of stakeholder contexts, on the variety of potential responses that it can stimulate and processes for managing the risks associated with strategic ambiguity as a strategic practice, including ways of maintaining facilitative circuits of power as ambiguity is reduced, in order to shed more light on this high discretionary strategic agency practice.
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